We seek to contribute to the emerging economic theory on trade, the environment and development. Using panel data across countries, econometric models are estimated to predict the effects of openness on organic water pollutant (BOD) and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Results indicate that freer trade significantly increases emissions of both pollutants, thus reducing environmental quality. Moreover, the panel nature of the data allows heterogeneity across countries to be controlled, so that comparisons can be made of how different national characteristics influence the environmental impact of freer trade. By testing the effects of democratic versus autocratic governance, it is found that while greater democracy can induce significant reductions in BOD emissions as openness increases, it may also lead to increased CO2 levels. Meanwhile, by testing for and failing to reject the pollution haven hypothesis, it is suggested that environmental gains from openness in relatively rich countries may be coming at the expense of environmental degradation in poorer countries.
Introduction
Few economists would argue with the assertion that trade liberalization increases incomes across countries. Freer trade leads to more goods available at lower prices than would otherwise be the case. However, many questions still revolve around other potential effects of openness to trade. This paper will focus on one of these questions:
What is the effect of freer trade on the environment? Issues that are examined include how trade liberalization affects the environment in individual nations and whether or not these effects can be assumed to carry across both developed and developing countries.
Attention is also focused on how different trade policies may distort the relationship between openness and the environment, and what potential policy responses may be implemented to balance these effects. The approach taken is based on emerging economic theory on trade, environment and development.
Extensive debate currently exists over these issues. Many environmentalists are concerned that trade liberalization will create international political pressure to reduce the stringency of environmental regulations, creating a "race to the bottom". Advocates of freer trade counter that openness between countries generates an economic surplus which can be applied to environmental protection (Damania et al, 2003; Karp et al, 2003) . A central issue in this discussion is the potential for trade liberalization to increase incomes, encouraging economic growth. Two studies by Grossman and Krueger (1993; 1995) , find evidence in support of an inverse U-shaped relationship between per capita income growth and pollution levels. Referred to as the Environmental Kuznet's Curve (EKC), this relationship hypothesizes that economic growth in a country will bring an initial period of environmental deterioration, followed by a subsequent phase of improvement.
The policy impacts of the EKC hypothesis could be significant, since it finds no evidence that economic growth related to free trade does unavoidable harm to the environment. (Grossman and Krueger, 1995) According to Antweiler et al (2001) , however, the relevant economic theory gives little reason to believe that free trade will influence all countries in the same way.
Instead, when considering the relationship between openness and the environment, it is important to consider the interactions between scale, composition, and technique effects created by different national characteristics and trading opportunities (Antweiler et al, 2001; Copeland and Taylor, 2004) . The scale effect of openness to trade increases environmental degradation through more intensive production. The technique effect reflects cleaner production processes, which arise from increasing demands for environmental quality as income levels rise. The composition effect will shift production between environmentally beneficial or damaging goods, depending on the competitive advantages between trading partners. The relative strength and direction of these effects will cause the impact of trade liberalization on the environment to differ across countries.
Furthermore, theoretical analysis highlights the potential for government policy and environmental regulations to determine these effects. The pollution haven effect hypothesizes that the stringency of environmental regulation distorts how competitive advantages are utilized by influencing plant location decisions and trade flows (Copeland and Taylor, 2004) . Meanwhile, Deacon and Mueller (2004) argue that corrupt governance may impede the technique effect by rendering governments unresponsive to public demands for greater environmental quality. Damania et al (2003) and Welsch (2004) also find that corruption can directly cause environmental degradation by reducing the effectiveness of environmental regulations such as emissions limits. Both the pollution haven effect and corrupt governance could thus affect the transferability of the EKC between countries.
To investigate these relationships further, an empirical study of the effects of trade liberalization on a country's environment is reported in this paper. Panel data across countries is utilized, including measures of pollution such as carbon dioxide emissions and organic water pollutant emissions, to evaluate the environmental effects of freer trade. Models test the effects of trade liberalization to see whether an EKC is observable in all or only particular countries. Moreover, the panel nature of the data allows heterogeneity between nations to be controlled, so that comparisons can be made of how national characteristics influence the impact of freer trade. Consequently, the hypothesis that the environmental effects of trade liberalization are transferable between developed and developing countries can be tested. Finally, a variable to control for governance is included in the model to specifically estimate the influence of democracy in determining the environmental impacts of openness to trade. This study is unique in its application of panel data to evaluate the impacts of trade liberalization on the environment while controlling for national characteristics that can distort the competing scale, technique and composition effects among countries.
Literature Review
This paper adds to a larger literature which has sought to identify the relationships between trade, economic growth and environmental quality. In addition to the works described above, Antweiler et al (2001) apply panel data on sulphur dioxide (SO2) concentrations to a theoretical model which divides trade's impact into scale, technique and composition effects. Their findings indicate that while the scale effect of openness increases concentrations of SO2 by 0.25 to 0.5 percent, it is outweighed by a larger reduction in concentrations (1.25 to 1.5 percent) from the trade induced technique effect.
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The overall effect of trade on pollution concentrations is thus beneficial, leading Antweiler et al (2001: 878) to conclude that "free trade is good for the environment." 3 Furthermore, the authors also test the pollution haven hypothesis by adding an interaction between 1 The composition effect is found to only lead to slight changes in pollution concentrations, and does not affect overall results (Antweiler et al, 2001) . 2 Of interest for the present study, Antweiler et al (2001: 878) make special note of the panel structure of their data set, which they were able to exploit in order to distinguish empirically between the negative scale effects of trade on the environment, and the positive technique effects of trade on the environment. 3 It is interesting to note that only the reduction in SO2 emissions indicated strong statistical significance. The effect of openness in reducing NO2 was "moderately" significant, while the effect on particulates lacked statistical significance (Frankel and Rose, 2005 Several authors have also addressed the more specific impacts of governance on environmental quality. As described in the introduction, corrupt governance can directly reduce the effectiveness of environmental policies that limit pollution, causing an upward shift in an EKC and an increase the per capita income level at which environmental improvements are realized (Damania et al, 2003; Welsch, 2004 were re-fitted into the -10 to +10 scale as the average of the other autocratic/democratic observations for the country in question. So as not to create bias, a dummy variable (Disrupt) was then created and set equal to one for the particular years in which a country had been coded as having a disruption in government.
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Descriptive information on the datasets is provided in Appendix A. For the BOD dataset, The scale is established with (-10=strongly autocratic, +10=strongly democratic). 10 An alternative approach to the specially coded governance data would have been to simply drop these observations. However, given the economic theory relating governance to the environment, it was hypothesized that political disruption could have significant environmental implications, meaning that these observations needed to be retained in the dataset. Re-fitting these codes to the index, while adding a dummy variable as described above, was considered the best method to capture these effects.
summarized by Table A: 2. From this information, it should be addressed that complete panels of data could not be obtained for all countries in the dataset. This is a common problem with panel data and can be corrected by using unbalanced panel estimation methods (Greene, 2003; Verbeek, 2004) . Unbalanced panel estimation avoids losses in efficiency by using all available observations, including those for countries that are not observed in all years of the dataset.
Econometrics 11
The use of panel data allows for the modeling of differences in behaviour across subjects. Heterogeneity across countries is therefore the central focus of the empirical analysis in this paper. To estimate models based on panel data, we can start with a simple linear model such as:
where β it measures the partial effects of x it in year t for country i. Panel data estimation then places additional structure on the coefficients, with the standard assumption being that β it is constant for all i and t. To capture the effects on y it that are peculiar to each Evaluating the use of fixed effects versus random effects models, we find an important difference in the interpretation of results between the two. According to Verbeek (2004) , fixed effects models concentrate on the differences "within" individuals,
therefore explaining to what extent the observed y t for country i differs from that country's mean y. A fixed effects model would therefore be appropriate if we wanted to 11 The econometric theory depicted in this section draws largely from the works of Greene (2003) and Verbeek (2004) .
make predictions about the changes in emissions over time for a particular country, since the fixed effects estimators consider the distribution of y it given α i . In random effects models, meanwhile, the estimated y it are not conditional on the individual country's α i , as the model instead "integrates out" these random parameters. A random effects model is thus more appropriate if we are not interested in the particular value of an individual country's α i , but instead want to focus on the differences in emission levels across countries with certain characteristics. Since the objective of this paper is to make inferences regarding the effect of openness on environmental quality, conditioned on the potential for national characteristics to influence results, the random effects model will be applied to our dataset.
Applying the assumptions of the random effects model to the simple linear model developed earlier, equation (1) can now be expressed as:
where μ is the intercept term and the random parameters α i are assumed independently and identically distributed (IID) over countries. Now, α i + ε it can be treated as a single error term consisting of two components: an individual specific component α i which does not vary over time and a remainder component ε it assumed to be uncorrelated over time.
The random effects estimators will be unbiased and consistent if α i and ε it can be assumed mutually independent, as well as independent of the observed x variables.
12
Applying this econometric theory, the model depicted in equation (2) will be estimated twice, once with BOD emissions as the dependent variable, and again with CO2 emissions as the dependent variable. All variables included in the models are described in Table 1 . 
Polity
The degree to which a country is either democratic or autocratic, as indicated by the Polity IV index (-10 = strongly autocratic; +10 = strongly democratic).
Pop
Total population.
Land
Land area (Square km).
Urban
Urban population (as a % of total population).
Disrupt
Variable created to capture the years in which a country was coded by the Polity IV project as having had a disruption in governance (1 = coded for disruption; 0 = no disruption, regular polity index applies).
Respond
Interaction term capturing the specific effects of GDP per capita for countries coded as democratic (index ≥ 1) by the Polity IV project.
Respond2
Interaction term capturing the specific non-linear effects of GDP per capita (i.e. GDP2) for countries coded as democratic (index ≥ 1) by the Polity IV project.
ATrade
Interaction term capturing the specific effects of openness to trade (Trade) for countries coded as strongly autocratic (index ≤ -5) by the Polity IV project.
Haven
Interaction term capturing the combined effects of GDP per capita (GDP) and openness to trade (Trade). The effect of openness on environmental quality will be given by the coefficient on the variable Trade. The quadratic term GDP2 is included in order to capture any nonlinearity in the effects of income per capita on environmental quality. An EKC would thus be indicated by a positive coefficient on GDP coupled with a negative coefficient on GDP2. The coefficient on the variable Polity will describe the direct effect of a country's governance on its environmental quality, but of greater interest for the purposes of this paper will be the estimators on the terms interacting governance with openness, ATrade, and with income: Respond and Respond2. Drawing from the economic literature discussed above, the interaction ATrade is included in order to test the hypothesis that openness will affect the environment differently in more autocratic countries than in more democratic ones. Respond and Respond2 are included in order to test the hypothesis that democratic countries will be more responsive to increased demands for environmental quality as per capita incomes grow, indicating a stronger technique effect from trade.
Finally, again based on the economic theory developed earlier, a third interaction term
Haven is also included in the model. Haven is estimated in order to test the hypothesis of a pollution haven effect between relatively rich and poor countries. 13 The random effects models to be estimated therefore take the following form: where i again represents the country and t the year.
Initial estimates of models (3) and (4) were run and the results are summarized by of freedom leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level.
Rejecting the null hypothesis in each case suggests that the x it and α i are correlated in both random effects models. This is problematic since it also suggests that the coefficients estimated with the random effects method will be inconsistent.
The potential correlation between the x it and α i in our random effects models can be corrected by deriving instrumental variable estimators. Hausman and Taylor (1981) 13 This approach to testing the pollution haven hypothesis is the same as that applied by Frankel and Rose (2005) . 14 The main reason that goodness of fit measures are generally not applied to panel data models is that the usual R 2 and adjusted R 2 indicators are only appropriate if the model is estimated with OLS (Verbeek, 2004) . 15 Correlation between x it and α i violates the random effects model's assumption that α i ~ IID(0, σ α 2 ), which is required for the FGLS estimator to be both consistent and efficient.
show that this can be accomplished by instrumenting the correlated variables by their value in deviation from the individual (or in our case country) specific means. Thus, while the exogenous variables x 1 , it serve as their own instruments, the variables correlated with α i (referred to as x 2 , it ) are instrumented as x 2 , it -x 2 i . These new instrumental variable estimators, referred to as the Hausman-Taylor estimators, are by construction uncorrelated with α i . This Hausman-Taylor approach is advantageous since it does not require the adoption of external instruments (Verbeek, 2004) . However, deriving instruments within the model will require the researcher to impose their own assumptions about which variables are correlated with α i . By inspecting the data sets, it is found that the maximum observations for both the GDP per capita and population data significantly diverge from the much lower mean and median values of the sample. 16 Moreover, these outlying values are observed for relatively few countries. Therefore, hypothesizing that the these large outlying observations for GDP per capita and total population are driving the correlation between the x it and α i in our models, the variables Pop, GDP, and GDP2, as well as those interacted with GDP per capita: Respond, Respond2, and Haven, are instrumented using the Hausman-Taylor technique.
Results
By regressing the dependent variables BOD and CO2 on our newly derived instrumental variables, we obtain consistent Hausman and Taylor estimators to which test statistics can be applied and inferences drawn concerning the hypothesized relationships between openness and environmental quality. Results for the Hausman and Taylor instrumental variable estimators are summarized in Table 2 . A few notes on specification deserve mention. The interactive term ATrade was initially specified to interact the effects of openness with countries that were ranked lower than zero by the polity index, thus capturing the specific impacts of freer trade for autocratic versus democratic countries. However, t-tests on the initial estimates for both models found this variable to be insignificant in explaining variation in either BOD or CO2 emission levels. An alternate hypothesis was thus formulated to test if strongly autocratic countries reacted differently to trade liberalization than weakly autocratic or democratic countries. ATrade was therefore re-specified to interact the effects of openness with countries ranked -5 or lower by the polity index, and it is these results that are summarized by Table 2. 17 A similar test was conducted for the two Response variables, however the results of increasing incomes for strongly democratic countries (ranked higher that +5 on the polity index) were not found to be significantly different from those for all democratic countries. Consequently, the more general result is taken to provide greater insight, and both Response and Response2 in Table 2 capture the interaction between per capita GDP and those countries ranked above zero on the polity scale.
Estimated Effects for Organic Water Pollutant (BOD) Emissions
Several inferences can be drawn from the estimated effects of the instrumental variables on the dependent variable BOD (Model 3). First of all, considering the direct effect of freer trade on emission levels, we can see that the variable Trade is significant at the 5% level, leading us to reject the null hypothesis that increased openness does not affect environmental quality across countries. Moreover, the positive coefficient on
Trade indicates that water quality, as reflected by BOD emissions, will be worse in more open economies, ceteris paribus.
However, when the estimator on the interaction variable ATrade is considered in addition to the results for Trade, an interesting picture emerges. The positive coefficient and small standard error on ATrade suggest that the environmental effects of openness to trade will be significantly different in strongly autocratic countries versus democratic or even weakly autocratic countries. 18 Moreover, the magnitude of the ATrade estimator, in comparison to the marginal effects on Trade, suggests that the increase in emissions for strongly autocratic countries will be empirically significant as well. Therefore, to the extent that an EKC for BOD emissions is observable, strongly autocratic governance will cause an upward shift in emissions for any given level of per capita income, meaning a 17 Upon re-specifying the variable ATrade to capture the effects of strongly autocratic countries only, an additional interaction term was added to each model to test the additional hypothesis that openness affects the environment differently in strongly democratic countries, compared to either weakly autocratic or weakly democratic countries. This additional interactive variable was found to be insignificant in both models, leading us to fail to reject the null that strongly democratic countries react similarly to freer trade as weakly autocratic or weakly democratic countries. This variable was therefore dropped from the specification in order to highlight the effects of openness on strongly autocratic versus all other kinds of governance, as captured by ATrade. 18 As discussed above, ATrade specifies "strongly" autocratic countries as those ranked -5 or lower on the Polity IV governance index.
higher peak in the EKC and greater degradation before environmental improvements occur.
To investigate the EKC hypothesis further, we must look at the estimators for the income per capita variables. The positive coefficient on GDP coupled with the negative coefficient for GDP2 indicate that a representative country in our sample will follow an EKC path of BOD emissions as per capita income levels grow. However, while the estimated effect for GDP is highly significant, the large standard error and relatively small marginal effect for GDP2 suggest that the downward sloping portion of the EKC might not be empirically significant.
Extending this analysis to test the hypothesis that increased incomes will lead to similar environmental quality responses in both democratic and autocratic countries, we next consider the estimators for Respond and Respond2 in combination with the GDP per capita coefficients. The negative, strongly significant coefficient on Respond indicates democratic governance reduces the increases in BOD emissions that will result from per capita income growth. Moreover, the magnitude of this estimator for Respond, in comparison to that for GDP, suggests that the marginal effect of an increase in per capita income will be significantly reduced for democratic countries not only statistically, but also empirically. We thus reject the null hypothesis that democratic and autocratic countries will be equally responsive to demands for environmental quality when per capita incomes grow. However, we also observe that the quadratic term Respond2, like GDP2, appears both statistically and empirically insignificant. This again suggests that non-linear effects of income growth on BOD emissions may not be observable, and thus casts doubt on the EKC hypothesis.
These results for the regression of BOD on our instrumental variables are depicted in Figure 1 below. The more gradual slope for the strongly democratic country reflects the significant impact of the Respond variable, which reduces the marginal effect of increasing per capita incomes on BOD emissions. The upward shift in the emissions path for strongly autocratic countries, resulting from the significantly different effects of openness on these countries as suggested by the estimator on ATrade, is also readily apparent. To depict the relationships in Figure 1 , all control variables are entered at their mean values; except for the dummy variable Disrupt which is included at its mode. Of interest, both higher total population levels, as indicated by Pop, and a higher percentage of urban as opposed to rural population, indicated by Urban, are found to significantly increase BOD emissions across countries. Meanwhile, a higher total land area, captured through Land, is found to reduce BOD emissions, suggesting that a country's population density may be significant in explaining organic water pollutants.
Estimated Effects for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions
Interpreting the estimated effects of the instrumental variables on the dependent variable CO2 (Model 4) yields some interesting comparisons. The variable Trade has a positive coefficient, indicating that CO2 emissions increase with openness to trade, and the small standard error on this estimator again lead us to reject the null hypothesis that increased openness does not affect environmental quality across countries. Furthermore, 19 Depictions for countries of average or strongly autocratic governance types are cut off at a per capita GDP of $15,000.00 because the BOD dataset does not support observations beyond this point.
the variable Polity is weakly significant in this model, and its negative estimator indicates that an increase in the democracy level of a country (or lessening of autocracy) will marginally decrease emissions of CO2. 20 However, the inclusion of ATrade, which interacts the effects of these two variables, is now found to be insignificant in explaining variations in air quality across countries. Therefore, while finding that both freer trade and governance significantly explain differences in CO2 emissions, ceteris paribus, we also fail to reject the null hypothesis that openness affects the environment similarly in autocratic and democratic countries.
Investigating the model further, we find a positive coefficient on the GDP Here, the positive coefficient and statistically significant effect of the Respond2 term directly counteracts the marginal effect of the GDP2 estimator. Moreover, the similar magnitude of these two estimators indicates that for democratic versus autocratic countries, the non-linear component of the EKC will be almost entirely reversed.
These results for the regression of CO2 on our instrumental variables are depicted in Figure 2 below. Since ATrade does not significantly explain any variation in this model, we no longer observe an upward shift in the CO2 Emissions -Income per Capita curve for strongly autocratic countries as opposed to all other governance levels.
Consequently, only two emissions paths are needed to explain the observed relationships:
one for democratic countries, one for autocratic countries. The curve for autocratic countries clearly displays the effects of both the GDP and GDP2 estimators, as we see it 20 The magnitude of the estimators on both Trade and Polity indicate good economic significance for their respective marginal effects as well.
begin to bend back down at higher per capita income levels. The more linear emissions path for democratic countries reflects the interaction of the GDP2 and Respond2 marginal effects. To depict the relationships in Figure 2 , all control variables are again entered at their mean values, except for the dummy variable Disrupt which is included at its mode.
Total population levels (Pop) are again found to significantly increase CO2 emissions across countries. The estimator on Land remains significant but becomes positive in this model, suggesting that the larger a country's land area, the higher its emissions of CO2.
This may reflect a need to regularly travel greater distances in large countries, thus producing more pollution. The percentage of urban population (Urban) is insignificant in explaining CO2 emissions, but the dummy variable Disrupt is now significant at the 5% level, indicating that the occurrence of a disruption in governance will increase emissions of CO2 in the destabilized country. 21 The depiction for strongly autocratic countries is cut off at a GDP per capita of $20,000.00 because the CO2 dataset does not support observations beyond this point.
The Pollution Haven Effect
The hypothesis of a pollution haven effect between relatively rich and poor countries is tested by including the variable Haven in each model. As discussed earlier, the pollution haven effect hypothesizes that relatively rich countries, which experience greater demand for environmental quality, may enact more stringent environmental Interpreting the results in Figures 3 and 4 provides some interesting insights.
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To begin, as reflected by the negative coefficients on the Haven variables, we see that in both models emissions increase as poor countries become more open to trade, but tend to decrease with greater openness in rich countries. In general, these observations support the potential for a pollution haven effect. The one exception to this trend is for relatively rich, autocratic countries in Figure 3 (the BOD model), where emissions appear to stay relatively constant as openness increases.
This anomaly can be accounted for by drawing on the observations in Figure 1 .
Recall that when estimating BOD emissions, autocratic countries were observed to experience higher emissions over all per capita income levels due to the positive, significant effect of the variable ATrade. Since ATrade captures the specific effect of increasing openness for strongly autocratic countries, its marginal effect increases as we 23 Of note, Figures 3 and 4 are shown with relatively rich countries assumed to have a per capita GDP of $15,000.00, while relatively poor countries are assumed to be at $500.00. These assumptions provide the largest divergence between rich and poor possible while remaining within observational limits of the dataset. Meanwhile, Polity values of (+ 5, -5) are chosen as they reflect the mid-point values on both the democratic and autocratic sides of the Polity IV governance index.
move along the x-axis in Figure 3 . Consequently, BOD emissions increase for autocratic countries as free trade increases, which likely negates any decline in emissions that results from a pollution haven effect. Moreover, this effect could also explain the steeper slope for poor, autocratic nations compared to the poor democratic ones in Figure 3 . The increased BOD emissions from the pollution haven effect are augmented for poor, strongly autocratic countries by further increases in emissions due to the more open economy as we move along the x-axis. These explanations for the different slopes observed in Figure 3 are supported by the results in Figure 4 , where the lack of a significant coefficient on ATrade for CO2 emissions generates parallel effects of increased openness for democratic and autocratic countries at the same income level.
Discussion
In the models estimated above, we find a ceteris paribus effect in which freer trade significantly increases emissions of both BOD and CO2. However, the panel data used in this study allows heterogeneity between nations to be controlled, so that comparisons of how national characteristics influence the impact of freer trade on the environment can be made. According to Frankel and Rose (2005: 85) , analysis of how country specific effects influence this relationship may be the most fundamental issue for policy, since; "if it is established that trade has an adverse effect on the environment solely because openness raises countries' incomes, …, not many would choose deliberate self-impoverishment as a means to a clean environment."
The model predicting BOD emissions suggests that encouraging more democratic governance may help to mediate the increasing emissions that arise with openness to trade. Interacting governance with income levels, it is observed that democratic governments can induce significant reductions in pollution as income levels rise. This may reflect the technique effect proposed by Copeland and Taylor (2004) . Moreover, the interaction of governance and openness finds that strongly autocratic governments lead to an upward shift in an emissions path, so that pollution is higher at any given income level for open countries. This result is supported by the argument of Damania et al (2003) and Welsch (2004) that corrupt governance can reduce environmental quality by failing to enforce regulations such as emission limits. These observations could be interpreted to suggest that the promotion of democracy will improve the relationship between trade liberalization and environmental quality.
The results from the model predicting CO2 emission levels are more troubling, however. In line with the arguments of Cole et al (1997) , we find that for democratic countries CO2 emissions, as a purely global externality, appear to increase almost monotonically with income, and thus with trade. These effects appear to be moderated for autocratic countries, though, where the data suggests the possibility of an EKC as per capita incomes increase. It is thus unclear how to interpret these results, as it makes little sense to suggest promoting autocracy as a means for reducing CO2 emissions.
Alternatively, Welsch (2004) suggests that we may be observing an indirect effect of governance on environmental quality, through which corruption reduces prosperity, thereby reducing per capita income levels. The result of this effect is to reduce emissions for poor countries on the upward sloping portion of an Emissions-Income curve. Still, further research into the relationship between trade and purely global externalities, such as CO2, is clearly needed. One potential avenue is proposed by Copeland and Taylor (2005) , who find that international agreements reducing pollutants, such as the Kyoto Accord, may be more efficient under conditions of free trade in goods.
Finally, the results from testing for the pollution haven effect also provide some cause for concern. Analyzing these effects indicates that relatively rich countries may be experiencing improved environmental quality through reduced emissions associated with openness to trade. These improvements are reflected by the downward sloping emissions paths as rich countries become more open to trade in Figures 3 and 4 . 24 However, by failing to reject the pollution haven hypothesis, it is suggested that these environmental gains may be coming at the expense of environmental degradation in poorer countries.
Emissions would thus not be reduced, but instead shifted outside of rich countries to poorer "pollution havens". The transferability of the environmental improvements that rich, developed countries appear to experience through trade liberalization is thus called into question, since currently developing countries may not be able to shift emissions outside their borders in the same way.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to report an empirical study into the effects of trade liberalization on the environment. Econometric models are estimated to predict the effects of openness on organic water pollutant (BOD) and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, and both models find that freer trade significantly increases emissions, thus reducing environmental quality. However, the panel data used in this study allowed inferences to be drawn beyond these ceteris paribus effects of trade liberalization. By controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity between countries, several additional observations are made regarding how national characteristics influence the impact of freer trade on the environment.
To acquire these results, initial estimates of models regressing both BOD and CO2 emissions were conducted with the random effects approach to panel data. The random effects model was chosen for estimation due to the desire to identify differences in emission levels across countries with certain national characteristics. Applying the Hausman test, however, it was found that the observed values of the explanatory variables were correlated with the country specific, randomly distributed error terms, thus violating one of the key assumptions for consistency of the random effects estimator. Hausman and Taylor estimators to adjust to unbalanced datasets was thus essential to the successful completion of this study. 
